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An International Comparison of Corporate Investment Behavior 





The purpose of this paper is to focus on the investment behavior of firms in the major 
developed economies in order to shed light on what aspects of such behavior might be 
particular to Japanese corporate society.    It has long been the case that aspects of the 
Japanese employment system viewed as particular to the country such as lifetime 
employment and seniority wages have received much attention from analysts.  
However, the behavior of Japanese firms with respect to the accumulation of 
capital—the latter being just as important as labor in the production process—is yet to 
receive sufficient analysis from an international comparative viewpoint.   
 
In this paper micro data on the manufacturing industries of Japan, the US and France 
are analyzed in order to establish the characteristics, if any, of Japanese investment 
behavior. The attempt of the paper is closely related to the issues of the governance 
structures of the Japanese corporate sector, especially the role of Japan’s unique ‘main 
bank’ system.   
 
The paper is divided into two parts. In the first part, we ask whether those forms of 
corporate behavior that are said to be features of the Japanese economy, such as 
yokonarabi behavior and long-term perspective on the part of managers, are actually 
reflected in the data.  While a number of difficulties are present in conducting an 
analysis along these lines, at least according to the methods adopted in this report there 
does not in fact seem to be any clear support for such hypotheses as yokonarabi  
behavior and long-sightedness in the data. 
 
In the second part, panel data is used to fit an investment function to the data from 
each country, and differences in the estimated parameters between countries are used 
to infer the features of investment behavior specific to that economy.  To our 
knowledge, this is the first attempt at such an analysis. Regarding the relationship 
between capital spending and fund raising, it is shown by the estimations that 
investment by Japanese firms is constrained to a large degree by cash flow.  In 
addition, it is seen that in a comparison of sensitivity to economy-wide factors and 
firm specific factors regarding profitability, Japanese firms are relatively sensitive to 
macroeconomic factors of profits.  ʵ2ʵ 
 
 
ᶗ ᶗ ᶗ ᶗç Empirical Studies of the ‘Unique’ Japanese Corporate System 
 
 
1.    The Literature on Japanese Corporate Behavior 
 
From the point of view of economists, a firm is agent of production, using such inputs 
as capital and labor to transform in some way and hence add value to an input, which 
is purchased in one market and sold upon transformation in another.  Of these two 
factors of production, it is usually labor—and employment practice in particular—that 
is singled out in discussions of the various features of corporate behavior that are 
hypothesized to be characteristic of Japanese firms.  Of these ‘unique’ employment 
practices, the lifetime employment system and the seniority wage system stand out as 
having received most attention.  However, these terms should not be taken too 
literally.    For example, the existence of these systems does not necessarily imply that 
a given worker will always work from entry into the work force until retirement within 
the same firm, and the systems do not actually operate in every firm within the 
Japanese economy.  Instead we can say that it’s a commitment to the long term 
relationship where in general and barring unusually poor financial conditions a 
‘normal’ employee (in terms of contract) will not face unilateral termination of his or 
her contract with the firm by which he or she is employed, and where the employee 
can expect increased salary and promotion at regular intervals in a way that is 
egalitarian but eventually aims at more accurate evaluation of individual productivity. 
A number of studies based on international comparison have found evidence of such a 
system at least for male workers in large corporations.  For such workers it is seen 
that average length of employment is longest in Japan and that the wage profile over 
time exhibits considerable curvature.  However, it is not necessarily the case that 
these systems are unique to Japan.    For example, countries in continental Europe (and 
Germany in particular) tend to have employment traditions that are relatively close to 
those found in Japan.1 
 
In addition, it is worth noting that these systems are not driven purely by tradition.  
Indeed, by guaranteeing long-term employment companies are promoting the 
accumulation of firm-specific human capital while gaining information on and 
                                                 
1    A study using recent data to examine average employment length and the wage curve is that 
contained in the 1996 Economic White Paper.   ʵ3ʵ 
 
 
providing incentives to workers through the process of long-term competition.    In this 
way it is seen that these ‘traditions’ are rational from an economic perspective.2 
 
As the above discussion makes clear, regarding labor there are a number of aspects of 
Japanese firm behavior that are in some sense characteristic of that economy’s 
corporate culture, although these characteristics are not always pervasive.  This 
naturally raises the question of whether the same is true for that other major factor of 
production, capital.  On this matter there is a relative shortage of research to date.  
In this paper our aim is to test empirically a number of hypotheses regarding 
characteristics of Japanese investment behavior in order to create a set of stylized facts 
describing the same. 
 
It is possible to present cases for and against the likelihood of country-specific 
investment behavior.    In economic theory a given vector of factor input costs will be 
associated with a (assuming strictly convex technology) certain combination of labor 
and capital according to the maximizing behavior of the firm.  Thus, specific 
conditions and resulting behavior in the labor market would be expected to have a dual 
role in optimal capital accumulation decisions.    On the other hand, capital, in contrast 
to labor, is highly mobile across borders.  The latter will tend to make capital and 
investment behavior more homogenous internationally. 
 
According to the work of Komiya (1993, in Japanese), large Japanese firms are not 
well described by the classical understanding of corporations as entities, which employ 
labor at the market wage and distribute the profits accruing from the use of that labor 
among the owners of capital.  Rather, he suggests that they are better explained by 
the ‘worker management model,’ whereby firms attempt to maximize payments to 
core employees within the lifetime employment system using residual earnings after 
general outlays to factors of production.  For such firms permanence and stable 
expansion have greater importance, implying a willingness to bear ‘growth costs’ such 
as capital spending and research & development in order to keep hold of even 
marginally talented staff.    In response, Yoshikawa (1991, in Japanese) argues that the 
model of Atkinson (1973) implies worker management firms will chose lower growth 
paths than traditional firms (i.e. those which maximize the value of their stock), 
                                                 
2    See, for example, Yashiro (1997, in Japanese) for a broad discussion of Japanese employment 
practices.   ʵ4ʵ 
 
 
suggesting that the investment of the former type of firm will in fact generally be 
smaller than that of the latter.3 
 
It is often pointed out that Japanese capital spending as a ratio to GDP has been high 
by international standards even in the so-called Stable Growth Period that has followed 
the first Oil Shock.    However, the reasons why this has been the case are not entirely 
clear.  Regarding the theory of investment behavior, We have seen the major 
development from the Jorgenson approach of viewing investment as a means of 
moving from the present capital stock to the optimal capital stock as determined by the 
relative price and technology parameters to the theory of Tobin’s q which based on the 
ratio ‘q’, the ratio of the firm’s stock market value to the resale value of the firms 
assets.    However, while investment behavior has been estimated by fitting investment 
functions in each county based on Tobin’s q theory, the explanatory power of these 
regressions is not always good and the data used in estimation and specification of 
function form differ among analysis.  Overall, international comparisons of 
investment behavior based on this line of analysis are problematic in practice. 
 
While there is a lack of theoretical analysis on the characteristics of Japanese firms, 
debate on this matter is often carried out by journalists and other such commentators.  
Examples of characteristics that have been hypothesized in mass media channels 
include the emphasis that Japanese firms are alleged to place on market share and 
yokonarabi behavior. In fact, questionnaires concerning the objectives of management 
conducted in Japan and the US often find that Japanese managers put more weight on 
market share than their American counterparts.4  Journalists often depict Japanese 
firms as caught in a cycle where companies are simultaneously trying to raise their 
share of a given market by heavy capital spending, which in turn leads to excess 
production capacity, imbalance between supply and demand and hence a worsening of 
profitability. 
 
Another supposed difference between Japanese and US firms that often comes up in 
public discussion is the relatively long time horizon over which decisions are said to 
be made by Japanese management.    For example, Dertouzos et al. (1989) argued that 
                                                 
3    In a dynamic model, Atkinson shows that when one takes the objective function of worker 
management firms to be the present discounted value of payments of the form described above a 
low rate of technological progress will lead to a situation where the subjective discount rate of the 
firm exceeds the market interest rate.    Consequently, firms select a relatively low growth path. 
4    Although it is slightly dated, see, for example, Dertouzos et al. (1989).   ʵ5ʵ 
 
 
the international competitiveness of US firms in the 1980s was falling and proposed a 
number of explanations.  One of these was that US corporations were subject to 
pressure from stockholders that led them to seek short-term rather than long-term 
profits, with the result that firms hesitate to undertake investments, which involve a 
heavy long-term financial burden and low short-term profits.  Dertouzos et al. used 
various examples to illustrate this point.    Among Japanese researchers too Yoshikawa 
(1991) and Komiya (1993), whom we have already had cause to mention, as well as 
other researchers such as Aoki, Koike and Nakatani (1986, in Japanese) have made 
either direct or indirect reference to the longer perspective of Japanese corporations.  
However, to date there has been very little empirical work on this idea of the 
difference in term of perspective between Japanese companies and US. 
 
Another important topic concerning capital spending is means of fund raising.  On 
this topic, however, a considerable amount of empirical research has already taken 
place. A number of options exist for fund raising that are open to private corporations, 
such as cash flow (internal funds), debt and equity finance.  According to the 
Modigliani-Miller Theorem, in a perfectly frictionless world with complete financial 
markets, no transaction costs and no taxes the value of the firm is independent of the 
means of finance, which it adopts.  In other words, in going about the objective of 
maximizing its own value the firm should decide the appropriate rate of capital 
spending, but not take into consideration the means with which this spending is to be 
financed. 
 
However, it is readily seen that this rather counterintuitive conclusion breaks down 
when the assumptions of no taxes5 or transaction costs are removed.  In a world 
without transaction costs it is possible for an investor to be fully informed about all 
relevant aspects of potential borrowers without incurring and costs. In reality, it is not 
feasible for a lender to gain all such information, and what information is gained will 
be costly.   In situations of asymmetric information such as this, the so-called agency 
problem arises between the lender (principal) and the borrower (agent).6 
                                                 
5    If we remove the no tax assumption, while the interest payment for debt is subtracted from 
profit as cost but the dividend payment isn’t tax deductible. Thus, equity finance or internal 
finance results in heavier tax burden than the case of debt finance. Therefore, the debt finance is 
the cheapest method of finance in the world with corporate tax.     
6    The agency problem refers to a situation that may arise when a principal entrusts through some 
form of contract an agent with the execution of a certain task from which the returns are to be 




Let us consider first the case of raising of funds through issuing debt. Under the 
system of limited liability, holders of stock in the firm are able to gain large returns 
when high-risk-high-return investment pays off and at the same time receive the 
protection of limited liability when the investment does not succeed. For holders of 
debt, however, return is limited to the interest payments specified in the contract and 
losses may be large if the firm runs into difficulties. When the firm’s creditors have 
insufficient control of the firm the company will generally chose relatively risky 
investments, thereby jeopardizing payments to the holders of debt. Given the presence 
of asymmetric information the control over the actions taken by a firm exercised by its 
creditors is necessarily limited, and in this situation the natural response of the holders 
of debt will be to include in the interest rate a premium to cover possible loss. 
Therefore, the cost of inside funds (cash flow) is low relative to debt. 
 
Consider now the case of equity finance. Now the principal is the owner(s) of stock 
and the agent is the management of the company in question. Here the incentives of 
the management are of course not fully described by maximization of the stock market 
value of the firm. The managers may well wish to maximize various tangible and 
intangible benefits accruing to them that are not fully consistent with maximization of 
stock market value, including fringe benefits and prestige from expanding the size of 
the firm. Since the majority of investors adopt the balanced portfolio strategy in order 
to disperse risk it follows that they have even less incentive than creditors to incur 
costs for the purpose of monitoring against such unproductive expenditure in any one 
specific firm. Thus from the assumption of rational behavior we can reasonably 
anticipate that as a result of this lack of sufficient monitoring on the part of stock 
holders, managers are likely to make less that fully efficient spending decisions 
leading to an effective loss suffered by the former. Again this loss will be built into the 
value of stock, and will be incurred by the firm when new stock is issued. Hence, 
inside funds (cash flow) are effectively cheaper than equity finance too. 
 
As we have seen in the discussion above, in a world of asymmetric information the 
cost of funds is lowest for cash flow, higher for debt and even higher for equity 
finance. In consequence, while firms that have ample cash flow for projects that are 
profitable at the cost of internal funds will be able to undertake all of these investments, 
                                                                                                                                               
inability of the principal to monitor perfectly the behavior of the agent leads to divergence of 
objectives, and as a result to the agent choosing actions that do not maximize the returns accruing 
to the principal.   ʵ7ʵ 
 
 
firms which are constrained by a shortage of cash flow will be unable to make 
investments which would have been profitable if external funds could be raised at the 
same cost as internal funds as a result of the agency problem. Clearly the greater the 
agency cost the larger the number of otherwise profitable investment projects that cash 
flow constrained firms will be unable to undertake, and, in turn, the larger the 
deadweight loss to society. It has often been claimed that established practices within 
Japan’s financial system, with its ‘keiretsu’ and ‘main bank’ relationships, have 
promoted the accumulation of information regarding borrowers and reduced costs of 
acquiring such information and therefore served to mitigate the inefficiencies 
generated by the agency problem. 
 
Based on firm micro data, a number of empirical studies have been made of the 
Japanese financial system.    Both Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) and Okazaki 
and Horiuchi (1992, in Japanese) divided firms according to the presence or absence of 
main bank and keiretsu affiliation and found that upon regressing a Tobin’s q type 
capital spending function with cash flow included as a dependent variable it could be 
observed that the effect of the cash flow restraint was weaker thus investment was 
generally stronger for firms with one or both of these affiliations.  Also using firm 
micro data, Nakatani (1984) divided firms into those affiliated with bank keiretsu and 
those without such affiliation.    It was shown that those firms with this affiliation had 
significantly lower but more stable profit, and higher debt-equity ratios than the other 
group.  In addition, Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990) showed that firms 
affiliated with a main bank had significantly smaller losses when financial difficulties 
arose, with banks aiding those firms that ran into difficulties as a result of the inherent 
uncertainties of investing but in turn receiving on average higher interest payments 
during normal times and the privilege of sending their officials to take part in 
management of the firm in question.    This is the ‘risk-sharing hypothesis’. 
 
 
2. Aggregations and Processing of the Company Level Data Sets 
 
In this chapter we use micro data at the firm level to test empirically for the existence 
or otherwise of yokonarabi  behavior and long-sighted decision-making within 
Japanese firms—both of which are hypothesized to be characteristic of Japanese 
corporate behavior.  The data we adopt is financial data from firms in Japan, France 
and the US.  The reason for including French firms in the data set along with those 
from Japan and the US is that France is an important representative of the European   ʵ8ʵ 
 
 
mainland economies.7  In this way, it becomes possible for us to draw comparisons 
between the Japanese system, the Anglo-Saxon model of the UK and the US and the 
so-called Rhine model centered on the German economy.8 
 
Data on Japanese firms was collected from the Development Bank of Japan data bank 
for firms listed on the Tokyo and regional stock exchanges.    That on US firms is from 
the COMPUSTAT database of Standard & Poors, while that on French companies is 
from the Groupe DASFA database.9 
 
The data set was limited to firms within the manufacturing sector. Of those there were 
1,286 Japanese firms in a 1956ʵ94 sample, 372 US firms in a 1980ʵ94 sample and 
289 French firms in a 1985ʵ94 sample.  In carrying out comparative analysis the 
data set was therefore restricted to the 1985ʵ1994 period. In the case of Japan the 
number of firms is seen to be much larger that for the other two countries.    However, 
in order to maintain homogeneity, it was decided that only the 400 largest firms would 
be included in the data set.10 
 
Table 1 gives a comparison of the distributions of the major financial indices of the 
firms in the sample described above for the three different countries.    The debt-equity 
ratio, which gives a good indication of the financial position of the firm, had an 
average of 223% for the Japanese sample, while those of the French and US samples 
                                                 
7    It is certainly possible to consider using German rather than French data.    The problem here is 
that many large German corporations are not listed, and as such firm financial data can be difficult 
to use.    France can perhaps be seen as falling somewhere between the Rhine model and the 
Anglo-Saxon model. 
8    The Rhine model is defined by Albert (1991), and refers to the type of capitalism characteristic 
of Germany, Switzerland, Northern Europe, and other such countries.    According to Albert in 
these economies the links between firms and banks are strong, relationships between employers 
and employees are stable over the long-term and tend to be cooperative, the public sector is 
relatively large relative to other market economies, and emphasis is placed on social equality. 
9    The Japanese data is from individual financial statements since these provide quite detailed 
information on the operations of individual firms.    For US data we used the more common 
consolidated statements.    For French data we would have preferred to use consolidated statements 
but due to availability used individual figures in the case where parent companies were the primary 
agents of operation and consolidated figures when parent firms were not actually involved in direct 
operation. 
10    Specifically, the 400 largest firms in terms of gross assets as of the most recent data.   ʵ9ʵ 
 
 
were lower at 180% and 165% respectively.   Relative to the French and US samples 
it was found that the variance between the averages of different industries was large.  
In Japan, particularly high levels were recorded by petroleum (591%), nonferrous 
metals (414%) and iron & steel (340%). 
 
Regarding the ratio of operating profits to current stock, a statistic that demonstrates 
corporate profitability, it is seen that the US rate averages a high 13.1%, far above the 
rates recorded in Japan (5.7%) and France (3.7%).  The series covers a period when 
the US economy was generally strong and as such cyclical factors may in fact play a 
part in the relatively high rate.    However, another interpretation is that the high rate is 
a reflection of the hypothesized tendency of US managers to focus on the 
maximization of return to holders of company stock. 
 
In order to compare the relative size of companies in the three economies we look next 
at gross assets.  To make a comparison possible the series are converted into dollars 
using the OECD purchasing parity rates.  It is found that Japanese companies are 
about half the size of their US and French counterparts by this measure.  The 
statistics may well be biased, however, by the exchange rate conversion and by the fact 
that Japanese statistics are calculated on an individual basis while the US and French 
figures are consolidated. 
 
Finally, we consider the rate of revenue growth, a statistic that gives an indication of 
the capacity for industry expansion.  The rate for Japan is the lowest at 3.5%, while 
those of the US and France are in double figures (14.8% and 11.6% respectively).  
One possible reason for the low Japanese rate includes the fact the much of the sample 
period is over the post-Bubble Economy recession.  Another is that the rate of 
inflation has been low in Japan relative to the other two economies. 
 
As has been shown in the preceding few paragraphs, the sample statistics show large 
differences between the large corporations of the three economies.  Moreover, if we 
consider these statistics it is hard to avoid the impression that from a range of 
perspectives including profitability, capacity for expansion and financial position 
Japanese firms are as yet generally weaker than their overseas, and especially US, 
counterparts. 
 
However, there are a number of reasons why we should avoid reading too much into 
the raw statistics.    First, the value of assets within corporate financial data is the book 
value so that even if statistics such as the debt-equity ratio are calculated in the same   ʵ10ʵ 
 
 
manner the real values in an economic sense may be elusive.  While previous 
researchers have attempted to overcome this problem by estimating market value for 
each type of asset, the authors of the present report were unable to obtain the necessary 
information to perform the estimation for all three countries, and as such it is the 
bookkeeping value that has been adopted.  However, flow base figures must be 
adjusted for the differences in inflation rates between the three economies.   
Investment and GDP deflators have been used for these purposes. 
 
Second, figures for the three countries are of course denominated in three different 
currencies.  While the above-mentioned OECD purchasing power parity rates have 
been adopted on this occasion, these and the effective rates often diverge greatly (this 
has been particularly true of the yen/dollar rate), implying that the choice of rate will 
have a significant impact on the resulting figures. 
 
Third, it is important to take fully into account the differences in accounting 
conventions between the three countries.  The main differences in accounting 
procedures are summarized in Table 2.   It is clearly the case that these differences in 
procedures are reflected in the final balance sheet figures.  One aspect, which is 
closely related to the analysis carried out in this report, is the re-evaluation of tangible 
fixed assets.  Evaluation of assets at market value, along with the presence of 
inflation implies that the value of assets tends to be larger then that is otherwise.  In 
addition, regarding calculation of depreciation costs the straight-line method of 
calculation combined with growth in the total size of tangible fixed assets tends to 
overvalue the assets compared with that of diminishing balance depreciation method.  




3.  Degree  of  Yokonarabi behavior in Japanese Industry 
 
It is often claimed in the mass media and by various other commentators that Japanese 
industry is particularly prone to so called yokonarabi behavior, with these claims being 
supported by various anecdotal evidence.  However, the definition and theoretical 
implications of such behavior are yet to receive sufficient consideration.    As such it is 
not surprising to find that there has been almost no empirical investigation of whether 
yokonarabi behavior is present in the capital spending decisions of firms. 
   ʵ11ʵ 
 
 
Yokonarabi behavior can be considered irrational, such as that stemming from various 
past industrial policies, or as rational choice taking into consideration the objective of 
maintaining share and long-term profits within the context of an oligopolistic market.  
Miyagawa, Wakabayashi and Uchida (1996, in Japanese) adopt the latter view in an 
empirical analysis of the paper & pulp, cement, iron & steel, electronic parts and 
automobile industries.  Estimating an equation taking capital spending as the 
dependent variable and including the cash flow and other such variables of other firms 
within the same industry as independent variables it was found that only paper & pulp 
showed evidence of yokonarabi behavior in the sense that these explanatory variables 
were significant. 
 
While this study is interesting in the sense that it investigates the relationships of 
mutual dependence that bind firms within a given industry as they relate to capital 
spending, if yokonarabi behavior is thought to arise as a result of firms attempting to 
maintain market share by adjusting the size of capital spending to match that of other 
firms in the industry then the study becomes insufficient. 
 
In this report we will attempt to estimate the extent of yokonarabi behavior by the 
direct approach of asking whether the firms in a given industry tend to have similar 
rates of capital spending at a given point in time.    To be more specific, for each of the 
different industries in each year of the sample and for each country the variability of 
investment in cross-section is measured by the variation coefficient.11  However,  use 
of the raw capital spending figures would bias the figures because of the differences in 
size of the various firms.  In this connection, capital spending has been standardized 
by making use of such size-related statistics as fixed tangible assets, gross assets and 
cash flow. 
 
Results are given in Table 3.  While the actual estimation has been carried out using 
cross section data from each year, since trends are generally similar from year to year 
the results have been pooled and the statistics show here are averages for the sample 
period.    As can be seen clearly from the figure, regardless of the size related statistic 
chosen the results are roughly similar for the three economies.    For example, looking 
at the variation coefficient based on fixed tangible assets standardization we find that 
                                                 
11    The coefficient of fluctuation for a given sample is the standard error divided by the mean.   
The statistic provides a measure of variance that is independent of the sample size.    It takes a 
value of zero if all observations in the sample are of identical value and increases with the amount 
of variation.   ʵ12ʵ 
 
 
apart from food and electric machinery in France most industries within the three 
economies range from 0.5 to 0.7.    In other words, the variance of investment between 
firms within the same industry is roughly similar for the three economies, and we are 
led to the conclusion that there is no clear evidence of yokonarabi behavior in any 
country or industry to be found using this approach to the data set. 
 
The method of investigation used above gives us, of course, no absolute information 
on the degree of yokonarabi behavior.  In this sense, it is difficult to rule out the 
possibility that Japanese firms tend towards this type of behavior based on the results 
that we have found so far.    However, it is possible to say that the data does not appear 
to support the hypothesis that Japanese firms are particularly prone to yokonarabi  
behavior. 
 
Unfortunately, long series of the type of financial data we are seeking are not available 
from the countries other than Japan, and as such international comparisons are limited 
to a recent 10-year sample.  However, data for Japanese firms is available in each 
year from 1956, so that in this case we are able to apply the above methods to a rather 
longer series.   Table 4 gives variability in cross section of the same type used above, 
with the period from 1956 to the recent past broken into four sub-periods.    The figure 
shows that, if we take the all industries row as being representative of broader trends, 
as a general tendency the further back into the past we go the lower the relative 
variability of capital spending. 
 
Looking now by industry it can be seen that for such materials processing industries as 
textiles, chemicals, petroleum, ceramics and iron & steel the trend of increasing 
variability over time holds true.  For machinery related industries such as electric 
machinery, precision machinery and transport machinery, however, there is little trend 
over time in the series.    In other words, for the machinery related industries the extent 
of  yokonarabi  behavior appears to be unchanged over time while decreasing in 
materials processing. 
 
One possible explanation for the different trends observed in the materials processing, 
machinery related industry figures concerns market conditions, and the extent of 
competition in particular.  On one hand, the machinery related industries have faced 
various forms of international competition in each period.    In the High Growth Period, 
there was import competition from American and European manufacturers and the 
market for such products continued to internationalize in the 1980s.    In years that are 
more recent, these industries have faced strong competition in the form of goods   ʵ13ʵ 
 
 
exported from other East Asian economies.  As such these firms have faced little 
change in basic market conditions.    On the other hand, materials processing industries 
were generally in a state of oligopoly during the High Growth Period but were later 
forced to adapt to more international and hence competitive markets as a result of 
increasing import penetration and demand from other Asian countries.  It may be 
supposed that the change in market conditions had the effect of lessening yokonarabi  
behavior over time as was observed in the series. 
 
In addition, during the High Growth Period the investment behavior of many Japanese 
firms was shaped in part by administrative guidance as one aspect of the 
comprehensive industrial policies that were in place.  One of the effects of this 
constraint on investment behavior may have been to cause certain similarities in firm 
investment decisions.  Researchers are divided as to what extent these measures on 
the part of the Japanese government were actually enforced or effective, but certainly 
there has been a history of intervention in the investment decisions of such materials 
processing industries as iron & steel, aluminum refining, textiles, shipping and 
petroleum.  Clearly, there is some possibility that the investment behavior of firms 
within these industries was influenced by government policy. 
 
The motivations that cause firms to act in collusive ways are not yet clearly 
established.  However, if government policies and oligopolistic market structure 
contribute to the yokonarabi behavior of large firms then it might be expected that a 
similar analysis that used only large firms in the sample would show stronger evidence 
of yokonarabi  behavior.  In this connection, estimation has been made using data 
from only the largest firms within chemicals, iron & steel, electricity, shipping and 
automobiles (5 to 10 firms per industry).  The results of the estimation are given in 
Table 5.    In general, the statistic is seen to be lower than was the case in Table 4.    In 
addition, for chemicals, iron & steel and automobiles it is observed that variability is 
increasing over time. 
 
In summary of our results on yokonarabi behavior as seen in the capital spending 
decisions of firms, while in the High Growth Period a relatively strong tendency 
towards  yokonarabi  behavior was observed, with that tendency being strongest in 
materials processing, if we look at the cross country data of the last 10 years it is seen 
that  yokonarabi  behavior has lessened over time and is now comparable to the 
situation found in France and the US.  While the causes of yokonarabi behavior are 
as yet not entirely clear, two possibilities are strategic behavior aimed at maintaining 
market share and other such concerns and industrial policy, although the latter is of   ʵ14ʵ 
 
 
less importance in modern day Japan.    That these two causes are of some importance 




4.    The Term Perspective of Japanese Management 
 
During the latter half of the 1980s in particular it was often claimed that while 
Japanese management took a long-term perspective and made capital spending 
decisions with a view to long-term results, US managers were overly concerned with 
the present value of the firm’s shares and as such were reluctant to carry out 
investment, which would reduce short-term profits.  However, it would appear that a 
stock market value would reflect long-term as well as short-term profits.  If the 
market is rational it is not likely to consistently require the sacrifice of long-term for 
short-term profits, and as such it is far from clear why US management would become 
shortsighted as a result of pressure from the stock market.  In 1989 Stein (1989) 
showed in a noncooperative game including managers on one hand and stockholders 
on another that even with the assumption of an efficient market there was no stable 
Nash Equilibrium and as a result that incentives exist for managers to pursue 
short-term as opposed to long-term profits.    However, the result is shown to hold in a 
finitely repeated game and it is not clear whether the findings will withstand 
generalization to an infinite dimensional problem. 
 
On the empirical side relatively little research on time horizons has been conducted as 
of yet, partly as a result of the difficulty of formalizing the problem.  For example, 
suppose the subjective discount rate, which a given firm uses to calculate present 
discounted profits, is large.  In this case the firm will have a relatively strong 
preference for present over future cash flow and will be observed to behave in a 
‘short-sighted’ manner.    However, it is not possible for the econometrician to observe 
the discount rate.12 
 
In this report, our approach will be to draw inference from the actual investment 
behavior of firms.  The intuition for the method that we adopt is as follows.  If a 
firm has a long time horizon then it may be expected that the firm will make 
                                                 
12    Suzuki and Takenaka (1982, in Japanese) estimated the discount rates of investors using an 
Abel type investment function and found that the value for Japanese investors was lower than that 
for US investors.   ʵ15ʵ 
 
 
investment decisions in accordance with its perception of the underlying growth 
potential of the economy.    On the other hand, if the firm makes decisions with an eye 
only to short-term profitability then it may be expected that the firm will react to 
short-term fluctuations in business conditions by varying capital spending.  If this is 
the case and if the potential rate of economic growth is less volatile than the actual rate 
then theoretically it is true that relatively high variance in the capital spending of a 
given firm will generally imply ceteris paribus a relatively short time horizon.    Based 
on the argument we have calculated the variation coefficient for each firm in the 
10-year series in order to analyze the extent of variability of capital spending for each 
company.  However it should be noted that the extent of business cycle fluctuation 
has not been the same for all three countries during the sample period, and, since 
capital spending by firms in economies that have experienced greater volatility will 
reflect this difference, the figures will be biased across countries.    In order to address 
the bias the variation coefficient for each firm has been deflated by that of the total 
value added of the industry to which the firm belongs within the country to which the 
firm belongs. 
 
Table 6 gives the distribution of the index of firm capital spending stability within that 
industry.  A small value for the index implies that the firm has carried out capital 
spending relatively independent of current business conditions, and as such the firm 
may be though of as having a relatively long time horizon.  The values given in the 
figure are the share of firms in a given class of stability when total firms in the 
industry are set at 100.    Values in the far right column are the average of the index for 
each industry.  Looking at the average for manufacturing it is found that Japan has 
the lowest at 4.98, with the US larger (7.35) and France larger still (10.00). 
 
These results appear to show that Japanese firms have relatively long time horizons.  
However, it should be noted that the sample period is one of boom and bust in Japan, 
and that the coefficients for total value added are large as a result.  Hence, deflation 
by these coefficients does bring down the Japanese figures considerably, although the 
variation in capital spending is large.    Overall, it is difficult to conclude that Japanese 
managers have the longest time horizons of the three countries.  Furthermore, if we 
look at a lower level of aggregation, it is seen that while there are a few industries such 
as food where the differences in the figures are large, in electric machinery and a 
number of other industries there is very little difference, a fact that further weakens an 
conclusion claiming that there is considerable difference in time horizons between US 
and Japanese managers.  Regarding France the volatility of the value added series is 
rather low in comparison to that of the other two countries and the index is large,   ʵ16ʵ 
 
 
suggesting that there may in fact be a preponderance of somewhat shortsighted firms 
within that economy. 
 
What should be kept in mind, however, is that investment spending by firms is not 
entirely determined by demand conditions.  Rather there is influence from such 
supply side factors as substitution away from or towards intermediate goods and labor 
input, and as such the results found above are not sufficient to allow us to make a clear 
judgment about time horizons of managers.  In summary, we suggest that the results 
should be interpreted as failing to show strong evidence that Japanese firms have 
considerably longer time horizons than US managers.  ʵ17ʵ 
 
 
ᶘ ᶘ ᶘ ᶘ  International Comparison Based on the Results of the Capital Spending 
Function Estimation 
 
1.    Estimation of the Capital Spending Function 
 
In the previous part firm level data related to capital spending was used for a number of 
estimations aiming to determine whether certain hypothesized features of Japanese 
corporate behavior were reflected in capital spending.  However, capital spending is 
determined by a range of variables and the data on capital spending used in the previous 
chapter alone may be insufficient for analytical purposes. 
 
In this part, we identify a number of likely variables and fit the resulting capital 
spending function to the data.    In this way we hope to make clear the nature of capital 
spending behavior while using the results from the US and French data to provide 
reference.  The data used in this chapter is company level data drawn from the same 
sources in the same three countries.  Although analysis of capital spending by fitting 
investment functions using company level micro data has become popular in recent 
years, these papers are confined to firms in one country13 and tend to adopt various 
methods of estimation, so that international comparison based on the existing literature 
is problematic. 
 
The significance of the empirical work conducted in this paper is that the same capital 
spending function is fitted to the micro data of the three countries (i.e. Japan, France 
and the US) so that the resulting parameter estimates can be used to draw out 
characteristics of investment behavior that may be specific to one or more of the 
countries in the sample.14  In order for such an international comparison to provide a 
useful basis of analysis, much care must be taken in specifying the capital spending 
function. 
 
In this paper, our starting point for specification is Tobin’s q.    In addition, we consider 
variables pertaining to fundraising and financial position.  As is well known, capital 
spending theory based on Tobin’s q—here q is the ratio of stock market value to capital 
                                                 
13    Regarding Japan see Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991), Okazaki and Horiuchi (1992, in 
Japanese), Asako, Kuninori, Inoue and Murase (1991, in Japanese), Hanazaki and Hachisuka (1994, 
in Japanese), etc.    Regarding the US, see, for example, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) and 
Schaller (1990).    Regarding the UK, see, for example, Blundell, Bond, Devereux and Schiantarelli 
(1992). 
14  Although the area of interest is different from that of the present research, a pioneering paper on 
international capital spending comparisons using micro data is provided by Cummins, Hassett and 
Hubbard (1995).    The paper uses balance sheet data from 14 different countries to investigate the 
influence of tax reform on capital spending.   ʵ18ʵ 
 
 
stock resale value—is a useful and generally applicable argument that covers as special 
cases such work as that of Jorgenson’s neoclassical theory.    However, while the theory 
itself is elegant the estimation of capital spending functions based on Tobin’s q is not a 
straightforward matter.    The reason is that this approach requires current as opposed to 
book values of balance sheet items, while in practice actual balance sheet entries are 
book values as is seen clearly in the case of Japan.  For the firms in three different 
countries in our sample, it is in practice more-or-less impossible to find current values 
for the purpose of estimation of Tobin’s q.15 
 
Taking the above into consideration it has been our approach to estimate q not from the 
balance sheet items but rather to use the fact that q is also found as the ratio of the 
marginal product of capital to the cost of capital as a result of the maximizing behavior 
of the firm16.  Using this measure, we investigate to what extent capital spending is 
sensitive to this ratio.  In other words, if return to asset (ROA) is used as a proxy for 
marginal productivity of the same and if the interest rate (R) is taken as the cost of 
capital,17  then we investigate the nature of the following equation. 
 
(1)    I = f (ROA, R) 
 
To this basic Tobin’s q type model we include consideration of various aspects of fund 
raising and other financial incentives and constraints.  That is to say, that the 
traditional Modigliani-Miller approach, whereby capital spending and fund raising is 
shown independent on the assumption of perfect financial and capital markets, is not the 
approach adopted in this report.  Rather incompleteness of markets and asymmetric 
information are recognized as causing nontrivial distortions in outcomes that lead to 
failure of the Modigliani-Miller theorem and the capital spending decision is largely 
affected by the fund raising and financial position of the firm.    By including variables 
related to those factors in the model to be estimated it becomes possible to derive 
certain implications about the functions of the different financial markets themselves. 
 
By adding additional explanatory variables to Equation (1), then, we get the model to be 
estimated in this report 
 
(2)   Iit = f (ROAit, Rit, CASHit, DEBTit, Kit) 
 
                                                 
15    For individual companies within Japan, Tobin’s q has been estimated by Asako, Kuninori, 
Inoue and Murase (1989, in Japanese), and Hayashi and Inoue (1990). 
16    For example, Suzuki and Takenaka(1982 in Japanese) and Suzuki and Otaki(1984 in Japanese) 
estimated Tobin’s q as a ratio of the return on asset to the cost of capital   
17    Here marginal return on asset is approximated by average return on asset and, regarding the 
cost of capital, taxes and depreciation expenses are ignored.   ʵ19ʵ 
 
 
Here I [investment] is net increase in tangible fixed assets + depreciation expenses,   
        ROA [return on asset] is (operating profit / average tangible fixed assets calculated       
         from  average  of  start  and  end  of  period  figures)ʷ100, 
        R [interest rate] is (interest payments / average interest-bearing liabilities   
         calculated  from  average  of  start  and  end  of  period  figures)ʷ100, 
        CASH [cash flow] is net profit/loss after tax - dividends - director’s bonus +   
         depreciation  expenses, 
        DEBT [debt-equity ratio] is (debt / net worth)ʷ100, and 
        K [capital] is a tangible fixed asset at start of period. 
 
Investment, operating profits, cash flow and interest rate are converted into real terms 
by, respectively, the investment deflator, the GDP deflator, the GDP deflator again and 
the wholesale or producer’s price index of each industry.  The first subscript is the 
cross sectional dimension of the panel and the second is the time series dimension. 
 
The theory behind Equation (2) is as follows.    Return on asset and the interest rate are 
from Tobin’s q theory, while cash flow and debt-equity ratio are related to fund raising 
and funding composition aspects.  Regarding cash flow, while a more detailed 
discussion is given below we can expect that since the cost of cash flow as an inside 
fund is lower than the cost of outside funds, an increase in cash flow will encourage 
investment, ceteris paribus.    On the other hand, an increase in the debt-equity ratio will 
give the impression of increasing risk, and as such access to funds will decline and this 
will, in turn, tend to weaken capital spending.    As for the capital stock, this is included 
as an explanatory variable because of the perceived need of firms to renew existing 
capital stock.  An alternative explanation is that large firms tend to have relatively 
large amount of capital spending.    Here capital stock is a proxy for the size of the firm. 
 
In summary, then, the a priori expectations for the signs are as follows. 
 
        ∂ I         ∂ I           ∂ I            ∂ I           ∂ I 
(3)    ʼ0,     ʻ0,     ʼ0,     ʻ0,     ʼ0 
      ∂ R O A        ∂ R        ∂ C A S H       ∂ D E B T        ∂ K 
 
As is clear from Equation (2), the data is a pooled two-dimensional data set (i.e. a 
panel) in the sense that there is a time series dimension and a cross section dimension.  
In this report, we adopt the Variance Components model approach to estimation. 
 
 
2.    Results of the Estimation 
 
The specification of (2) we have used is linear in the log of all variables except those 




(4)   ln  Iit = ai + b ROAit + c Rit + d ln CASHit + e DEBTit f ln Kit  
 
Our interest in running this regression is to compare estimated coefficient values for the 
three countries in the sample (i.e. Japan, France and the US).  In the first case 
regression was run for all manufacturing industries, and in the second case regressions 
were run for each industry separately.  In each case, the data was pooled across the 
three economies. In order to draw the cross country comparisons with the pooled data 
set dummy variables were used to indicate the country, which generated the data. 
 
Consider, for example, the following generic regression model with one explanatory 
variable and two different sources of data. 
 
 Y 1 = a + b1X1 + u1   (group 1) 
çç  Y 2 = a + b2X2 + u2  (group  2) 
 
Now define a dummy variable D such that the dummy takes on a value of zero for data 
generated by the first group and a value of one for data generated by the second group 
and consider the following equation. 
 
(5)    Y = a + b1X + (b2  ʵ b 1) DX + u 
 
The coefficient of DX is the estimated difference between the parameter belonging to 
the first group and that of the second group.18 
 
In our case, a dummy for Japanese data takes a value of one for data generated by 
Japanese firms and a value of zero otherwise.  A French dummy is defined similarly. 
We estimated the difference in each coefficient among three countries by adding Japan 
and France dummies in each explanatory variable. The results of the regression of 
Equation (4) with these dummies are shown in Table 7.    The US coefficients shown in 
the figure are estimated actual coefficient values, while those for Japan and France are 
the difference between estimated actual values for that country and estimated US 
coefficients.    We shall call these the (estimated) shift coefficients. 
 
Looking at the adjusted R
2, a statistic that gives a general measure of the explanatory 
power of the regression, we find that the value ranged from a low of 0.80 in nonferrous 
metals to a high of 0.95 in petroleum.  Overall, the statistic was distributed closely 
around the 0.9 levels.    This is a reasonable level for panel data estimation. 
                                                 
18    It is necessary to assume here that the error term follows the same distribution in the data 




Considering now the values taken by the estimated coefficients of the various 
explanatory variables, return on asset was seen in the US to be positive and 
significantly different from zero in all industries but textiles, chemicals and precision 
machinery.  The negative signs of most of the estimated shift coefficients of the same 
in Japan and France indicate that the estimated actual coefficients are lower in those 
two countries than in the US.  These shift coefficients were significant in 8 out of the 
15 industries in Japan and 11 out of the 15 (actually out of 14 because the French 
nonferrous metals sample is empty) in France.19 
 
While return on asset tended to be highly significant as an explanatory variable, this 
was not generally the case for interest costs paid by each corporation.   In the US, this 
latter variable was significant only in paper & pulp, chemicals, petroleum, nonferrous 
metals and transport machinery.  Moreover, in nonferrous metals and transport 
machinery the sign of the coefficients were positive, contradicting a priori sign 
expectations.    Similarly, in Japan and France few industries showed highly significant 
(shift) coefficients for interest payments. 
 
Regarding cash flow, in the majority of cases, the sign was positive as expected and the 
coefficient was significantly different from zero.  The coefficient was positive in all 
US industries and significant in all except iron & steel, nonferrous metals and metallic 
products.    In Japan, the coefficient was significant in 11 industries, while in France the 
figure was seven.    Comparing the size of the coefficient between the three countries, in 
many industries that of Japan was the largest, followed in order by France and the US.  
The elasticity of capital spending for all industries with respect to cash flow was 0.29 in 
the US, 0.35 in France and 0.56 in Japan. 
 
Looking now at the coefficient of the debt-equity ratio, as was the case with interest 
payments the number of industries within which this explanatory variable was highly 
significant was rather small.    In the US, the coefficient was negative and significant as 
would be expected from the theory only in manufacturing as a whole, in food and in 
electric machinery.    Looking at the shift coefficients in France and Japan it is seen that 
the coefficient was significant only in a few cases and the sign was often wrong. 
 
Lastly, let us observe estimated coefficients for the capital stock.   It turns out that the 
capital stock has very strong explanatory power.  In the case of the US, all industries 
have positive and significant coefficients.  The shift coefficients in France and Japan 
                                                 
19    Here the manufacturing sector as a whole, which is calculated by adding the different industrial 
groups together, is counted in the total even though it may perhaps be inappropriate to treat along 
with the other industries.   ʵ22ʵ 
 
 
are generally negative and significant, implying greater sensitivity to this variable 
within US industry. 
 
In summary of the overall trends we have uncovered in the above discussion, in all 
three countries the capital spending decisions of firms are generally sensitive to return 
on asset, cash flow and the size of existing capital stock, while on the other hand the 
interest rate and debt-equity ratio were found to be unimportant in terms of explanatory 
power.  In the remainder of this paper the results from the above regression are 
extended in a number of ways in order to clarify the various characteristics of capital 




3.    Cash Flow and Capital Spending 
 
Were it the case that internal funds (i.e. cash flow) and funds raised externally to the 
firm had the same cost then fund raising and the optimal amount of capital spending 
would be independent.  However, as soon as we accept the existence of the agency 
problem we are forced to conclude that the cost of finance from cash flow and the cost 
of that from external sources differ, and that the amount of cash flow, the relative price 
of which is low, will influence the optimal amount of capital spending. 
 
As was discussed in the previous part, according to the agency approach of industrial 
organization, for a range of reasons there is a tendency for the information available to 
the agent and the principle to be asymmetric, a situation which provides incentives for 
moral hazard type behavior on the part of the agent and leads to the emergence of 
agency costs.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) define agency costs to be the sum of the 
following three individual costs. 
 
a.  The costs of monitoring in order to prevent adverse behavior on the part of the 
agent due to moral hazard. 
 
b.  Premium to guarantee that the agent will not take actions that would adversely 
affect the welfare of the principal. 
 
c.  Cost related to the divergence between the optimal policies of the agent and the 
principal. 
 
Agency relationships of the above nature can be found in the relationship between 
stockholders (principal) and managers (agent) or between managers (principal) and 
workers (agent).  In the case of corporate finance, however, the relationships with   ʵ23ʵ 
 
 
which we are concerned can be summarized as those between external suppliers of 
funds (principal) and the firm (agent). 
 
Suppliers of funds such as banks, buyers of corporate debt and holders of new stock 
issues react to imperfect and asymmetric information in financial markets by making 
use of a range of monitoring devices and by including a premium on top of the 
(imputed) interest rate in line with perceived risk.    Therefore, to the extent that agency 
cost is included in the cost of external funds and passed along to the corporation, the 
amount of cash flow will come to have important bearing on the investment decision of 
firms. 
 
To sum up this relationship between capital spending and fund raising from a slightly 
different perspective, when seeking to fund a given investment the company will react 
to the presence of the agency cost by funding as much as possible by internal funds.  
However, if internal funds are insufficient to meet spending plans the remainder will be 
funded from external sources, beginning with the cheapest source of external funds.  
This process simply reflects rational choice on the part of the firm. 
 
This so-called financing hierarchy20 is shown graphically in Figure 1.  If we assume 
that the firm has a choice of three different sources of funding, namely cash flow, bank 
lending and equity finance (issue of new stock), finance will proceed from cash flow to 
bank lending and then to equity finance as a result of the existence of agency costs.21  
While in the figure optimal investment is at I1, in the case where cash flow is very 
plentiful it might be the case that investment would increase out to I2. 
 
In this way the agency problem leads to a failure of the Modigliani-Miller theorem and 
the capital spending decisions of firms becomes intimately related to fund raising.  
Indeed, as was seen in Table 7, cash flow is significant and positive in the capital 
spending function and these results are suggestive of an important role for fund raising 
issues in investment decisions.    In other words, the table shows that in each country in 
the sample cash flow serves as a constraining factor in spending decisions. 
 
Next, we note that, as was mentioned above, the coefficient of cash flow was generally 
largest for Japanese industries, followed by those of France and then the US.  These 
results suggest that the internal funds constraint is most binding in Japan and weakest in 
the US.    How, then, should we interpret these results? 
                                                 
20    See Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), Oba and Horiuchi (1990, in Japanese), or Noma, 
Hanaeda, and Yonezawa (1992 in Japanese), for example. 
21    We wish to stress, however, that the order shown in the figure of the financing hierarchy is just 
an example, and that it is not possible to give a set order of funding cost for such alternative sources 




As was discussed above, the reason cash flow acts to constrain investment is that 
external funds are relatively expensive because of agency costs.  From this 
interpretation it follows that we must recognize the importance of monitoring of firms 
that attempts to mitigate imperfect and asymmetric information and, in turn, lessens the 
impact of the agency problem.  As has been emphasized out by Aoki (1994), 
monitoring proceeds in three stages from evaluation of the project to monitoring the use 
of funds and finally to various measures in the event that the firm should run into 
financial difficulties.    The principal who carries out these monitoring activities will be 
influenced by the various characteristics of the financial market in the country in which 
it is operating. 
 
Figure 2 gives some indication of external fund raising by the non-financial sector in the 
three countries under consideration.   In Japan it is seen that lending from banks is the 
most important method of raising money, while in the US a greater share of fund raising 
is through corporate bonds than is the case in the other two countries.  In France the 
main fund raising method is equity finance.  In other words, Japanese firms are 
relatively dependent on banks for the supply of their funding needs, while in France and 
the US the capital market is relatively important. 
 
In the face of these differences in corporate financing systems between different 
countries, let us consider how monitoring is carried out by the various principals.  In 
Japan, it is generally the case that the main bank conducts all three stages of monitoring. 
In other words, the conventional view points out that the main bank system plays an 
essential role as one of the most important components of the corporate governance 
structure in Japan. In the US, on the other hand, the monitoring function is dispersed 
between a range of organizations, including investment banks, bond rating agencies and 
venture capital.  Lastly, monitoring in France is carried out around the central role 
played by the savings and commercial banks within the universal banking system.22 
 
In discussions of monitoring by creditors in different countries the Japanese main bank 
system is often held to be effective in tracking the activities of agents.   A well-known 
example is the research of Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991).  Here Japanese 
firms are divided into two groups, those belonging to keiretsu with strong affiliations 
with a given bank and those firms not belonging to keiretsu and with only weak 
affiliations with banks.  For both groups, a separate estimation of the extent to which 
                                                 
22    As is seen in Germany, under universal banking, direct lending tends to play a dominant role in 
financing investment, with corporate bonds and equity finance rather weak.    However, steady 
deregulation in France during the latter half of the 1980s and, in addition, the French ‘Big Bang’ of 
1988 has led to a strengthening of the securities markets.    As is seen in Figure 2, equity finance, 
once rather unimportant, has in recent years become a major source of funds.   ʵ25ʵ 
 
 
cash flow acts as a constraint on investment was carried out.  The results showed that 
capital spending by firms within keiretsu was less sensitive to cash flow than was the 
case for independent firms.  The authors argued that these results implied that the 
traditional main bank and keiretsu financial system was effective in mitigating 
imperfect and asymmetric information, and, moreover, that the lack of such a system in 
the US could be contributing to the degree to which firms in that economy are 
constrained by cash flow. 
 
In contrast, by using a similar firm level data set and the same function for estimation 
across countries, this report has found results contrary to those of Hoshi, Kashyap and 
Scharfstein (1991), specifically that the cash flow constraint is strongest in Japan.  In 
other words, this paper suggests that the monitoring system of main banks in Japan may 
not in fact be as effective as has been previously thought.    At the same time, however, 
the following two points need to be kept in mind. 
 
First, the sample period used in our estimation is one where the monitoring function of 
main banks is thought to have weakened in Japan.  The sample adopted in the present 
study, which is from FY1980 to FY1994, not only includes large fluctuations in 
business conditions with the Bubble Economy and subsequent collapse, but also 
financial deregulation and internationalization of the economic structure and an 
accompanying shift in the fund raising practices of large corporations away from banks 
and towards bonds and stocks.  At the same time, banks reacted to these changes by 
investing in land and other secured loans.  Overall, the ability of banks to monitor 
companies appears to have declined sharply during these years. 
 
Second, as was observed in Table 1, there are slight differences in the samples for the 
three different countries.    For example, comparing the balance sheet positions of firms 
by focusing on the debt-equity ratio as an average for pooled data in each country we 
found that while the ratios were 165% and 180% in the US and France respectively, in 
Japan the figure was 223%.  As is clear from the Modigliani-Miller theorem, highly 
levered firms will have high financial risk and a high standard error on return per share.   
Now the figures indicate that Japanese firms are, as a whole, more highly levered and 
hence more risky than their US and French counterparts.23    With this in mind, it can be 
argued that the relative strength of the cash flow constraint is a result of the high-risk 
nature of the Japanese firms in the sample. 
 
In summary, then, the differences in economic conditions and structure in different 
countries make it difficult to draw a simple conclusion on the relative strengths of cash 
flow constraints in the sample countries.    Never-the-less, our findings make it difficult 
                                                 
23    For simplicity, we are assuming here that business risk is more-or-less the same in the three 
economies.   ʵ26ʵ 
 
 
to take as given the argument that the Japanese external financing system centered on 
main banks is more effective in mitigating agency costs than is the US (or French) 
system centered as it is on capital markets such as those for bonds and stocks. 
 
 
4.    Capital Spending by High Risk Firms 
 
In general, risk faced by holders of corporate stock comprises of financial risk and 
business risk.  In this section, however, our interest will be in financial risk and, in 
particular, how the capital spending decisions of firms are affected by the amount of 
financial risk to which they are subject.    In order to carry out this analysis firms will be 
divided into a high-risk group and an ‘otherwise’ group.  Although there is no 
generally accepted definition of what comprises a high-risk firm, for the purposes of 
this report high-risk firms will be classified as those with debt-equity ratio of equal to or 
higher than 300%.24 
 
In contrast to the method of estimation adopted in the previous section where data for 
each industry was pooled across countries, in this section the estimation is carried out 
within each country.    A dummy variable is defined to take the value of unity for firms 
with debt-equity ratio of 300% or more and zero otherwise and included in the 
regression in order to observe the differences in coefficients for the two groups of firms. 
 
In Table 8 the results of the estimation are displayed.  The table gives the actual 
coefficients for firms with a debt-equity ratio of less than 300% and the ‘shift’ value of 
the coefficients for the high-risk firms that are the difference in the value of the 
coefficients for the two groups.  At a very general level it is seen in the table that for 
all countries the number of times that the shift coefficients have shown up as 
significantly different from zero is about one quarter, implying that there is not a great 
deal of difference between the capital spending decisions of high risk firms and those of 
other firms.  Indeed, for France and the US the number of industries where the shift 
coefficients are significant for all variables (excluding debt-equity ratio) is less than 
three. 
 
For Japan’s 15 industries significant shift coefficients implying differences in 
investment behavior between the two groups are found in 8 industries for capital stock, 
in 7 industries for cash flow and debt-equity ratio, and in 6 industries for return on asset.   
                                                 
24    In reality some firms have a ratio that is above 300% in some periods and below in others.   
These firms are classified into one of the two categories depending on the figure in the given period.   
The share of high-risk firms so defined in the total is 8.7% in the US, 13.2% in France and 18.2% in 
Japan.   ʵ27ʵ 
 
 
The direction of the shift for high-risk firms is positive for capital stock and return on 
asset and negative for cash flow and debt-equity ratio. 
 
Regarding the debt-equity ratio coefficient in particular, for the under 300% group in all 
three countries most industries recorded positive values despite a priori expectation of a 
negative sign.  In other words, for companies with a low ratio a marginal increase in 
leverage is not recognized as an increase in risk, implying that capital spending is not 
negatively affected.  For firms where the ratio is over 300%, on the other hand, a 
significant negative shift coefficient is found in seven Japanese industries, five US 
industries and four French industries.  In addition, if we calculate the actual 
coefficients for these industries (as opposed to the shift coefficients) the value is found 
to be consistent with theory, i.e. negative, in all 5 US industries, all 4 French industries 
and 3 of the 7 Japanese industries.  It appears that for high-risk firms that a marginal 
increase in leverage does in fact act to restrain investment. 
 
Focusing on the cash flow coefficients for Japanese firms, for firms with a debt-equity 
ratio of under 300% it is found that the estimated coefficients are, for all industries 
barring petroleum, positive and highly significant, implying that cash flow is an 
important constraining factor in investment decisions.    On the other hand, for high-risk 
firms as we have defined them, the value of the coefficient is lower for seven of the 
industries.  In other words, high-risk firms seem to be less constrained by cash flow 
than the other group.    Incidentally, this effect of a lessening of the cash flow constraint 
for high-risk firms did not appear in the French sample at all and appeared for only 
three of the industries in the US.  Thus, it seems that this phenomenon is rather 
particular to Japan. 
 
The weakening of the cash flow constraint for high-risk enterprises can be explained in 
terms of the monitoring function of main banks.  Highly leveraged firms will tend to 
have relatively lower cash flow than other firms because of high interest payments and 
other such factors.  Main banks tend to give such firms special attention in terms of 
monitoring, and by improving the firms’ creditworthiness help indirectly to lessen the 
impact of the cash flow constraint.    In the last section we demonstrated that it was not 
necessarily the case that the Japanese financial system centered on main banks is more 
effective than the French or US systems centered around the capital market in 
mitigating the constraint that lack of cash flow places on capital spending.  However, 
the results of this section suggest that when we differentiate firms in terms of leverage 
we find that for some types of firms, namely high-risk firms, main bank monitoring is in 
fact effective in mitigating the constraint. 
 
 
5.    Responsiveness to Economy-Wide and Firm Specific Factors 
   ʵ28ʵ 
 
 
As was explained above, the basic capital spending function used in this report as seen 
in Equation (2) is based on Tobin’s q approach with additional consideration of fund 
raising and balance sheet issues.  The theory behind Tobin’s q is that holders of stock 
will make rational appraisal of the return to investment and its present discounted value.   
Thus, the rate of return on asset used in the model can be thought of as representing 
expected future returns. 
 
However, the return on asset data used in this report is simply actual return per unit of 
capital in the period in which the investment is carried out.  It follows that the 
approach we have taken models expectations as static, i.e. that present return on asset is 
thought of as reflecting return in the next period. 
 
However, when treating expected return on asset in a formal model a number of 
alternative approaches are available.  In this section, we will adopt one of these 
alternative methods in order to look at characteristics of capital spending in the same 
three countries from a different perspective.  Specifically, in this section we will use, 
in addition to the same return on asset variable used to date, proxy return on asset in the 
form of rate of growth of economy-wide value added and average return on asset in the 
industry to which the firm belongs. 
 
Regarding the rate of growth in gross domestic product, this variable is of course one of 
the most immediate indicators of the average state of domestic economic activity, and 
as such plays a primary role in the formation of business plans by corporate managers.  
On the other hand, return on asset is a vital micro level indicator of the business 
conditions facing a given firm.  Average return on asset for a given industry is in a 
sense somewhere between these two indicators in terms of level of aggregation and 
serves to indicate the state of the business environment for that industry. 
 
Using these three variables we intend to investigate whether the capital spending 
decisions of firms in the sample tend to be sensitive to economy-wide (macroeconomic) 
shocks, to industry-wide (semi-macroeconomic) shocks or to firm level (idiosyncratic) 
shocks. 
 
Table 9 gives the result of estimation including two of the above three variables, namely 
return on asset of the individual firm and national growth rate, in the same regression.  
The other explanatory variables are, as was the case in Tables 7 and 8, interest rate, cash 
flow, debt-equity ratio and capital stock.    The regression was run separately for each of 
the three different countries in the sample.  Table 9 gives coefficients for only firm 
level return on asset and economic growth rate.25 
                                                 
25    Because the explanatory variables are largely independent the overall fit of the regression and 




The table shows large differences in the patterns of sensitivity of capital spending 
between countries.  Looking at the results from the US sample first, while return on 
asset for the individual firm has a coefficient sign consistent with the theory (i.e. 
positive) and highly significant in all industries except textiles, that of macroeconomic 
growth rate is significant and positive only for ‘other manufacturing’.  In contrast, in 
Japan the individual return on asset variable is significant and positive only for three 
industries while the macroeconomic growth rate is highly significant for 11 out of the 
15.   In France, capital spending does not appear to be particularly responsive to either 
of these two variables. 
 
Table 10 gives the results of estimation that is the same as that of Table 9 apart from the 
addition of the industry average return on asset variable.  Counting the number of 
industries where a priori expectations regarding the sign (i.e. positive) and significance 
of the coefficient are satisfied, we find that in the US for individual firm return on asset 
there are 12 industries, for average industry return on asset there are 5 and for the 
economy-wide growth rate there is 1.  In Japan, on the other hand, the corresponding 
figures are 2, 4 and 10.  In France, very few coefficients come up positive and 
significant regardless of the level.26 
 
Summarizing the differences we have found in capital spending behavior of US and 
Japanese firms in Tables 9 and 10, there is a remarkable contrast in the level of 
economic activity to which capital spending responds, with US firms responding to firm 
level shocks while Japanese firms tend to pay more attention to economy-wide shocks.  
The fact that Japanese managers are more responsive to macro-level shocks implies that 
firm behavior will exhibit similarities.  These similarities may be interpreted as 
yokonarabi behavior by commentators. 
 
In addition, this responsiveness of capital spending to economy-wide shocks on the part 
of firms has important implications for the business cycle.  In particular, in times of 
boom, investment will tend to increase further and in times of recession, capital 
spending will tend to fall further.  In other words, this aspect of investment behavior 
will have the effect of amplifying business activity fluctuations.   In fact, this has been 
the case in the boom and bust of the late 1980s and early 1990s, a period that witnessed 
a surge followed by abrupt decline in capital spending that has hindered the subsequent 
return to growth. 
 
                                                 
26    On this point (i.e. the low explanatory power of return on asset in French firms’ capital 
spending decisions) an explanation that has been offered is that an artificially high interest rate has 
been used to protect the French currency and therefore investment spending is not responsive to 
return on asset.    However, economists recognize the lack of sensitivity as a puzzle now.   ʵ30ʵ 
 
 
The differences in responsiveness of capital spending to return on asset between Japan 
and the US indicate that for the government bodies responsible for smoothing the 
business cycle may well need to adopt methods specific to their own economies.  The 
results also suggest that on the question of differences in capital spending decision 
making between the two countries that there is room for re-evaluation in the light of the 
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却潮攬⁃污礠☠䝬慳 ㄮ 㘮 ㌰⸸ 㐷⸷ 㜮 㐮 ㄮ 㐰㌴⸰ 㘵
䥲潮…⁓瑥敬 ㄸ⸶ 㠮 㔰⸸ ㄵ⸳ 〮 㘮 〮 ㄶ㜱⸴ 㔹
乯湦敲牯畳⁍整慬
䵥瑡氠偲潤畣瑳 㐮 㐱⸰ ㄰⸳ ㈲⸲ ㄱ⸱ 㘮 㐮 㘶㘴⸹ ㄱ
乯渠䕬散瑲楣慬⁍慣桩湥特 㔮 㐷⸶ ㄰⸵ ㈷⸶ 㠮 〮 〮 ㄲ㈵⸲ ㄰
䕬散瑲楣慬⁍慣桩湥特 㠮 ㌳⸹ ㄶ⸴ ㈲⸸ ㄱ⸷ 㔮 ㄮ ㌹ㄷ⸱ ㄷ
呲慮獰潲瑡瑩潮⁅煵楰浥湴 〮 ㄹ⸶ ㄰⸱ ㌳⸳ ㄳ⸰ ㄵ⸲ 㠮 ㄴ㘳〮 ㄳ
偲散楳楯渠䥮獴牵浥湴 ㄱ⸱ 㐸⸱ ㈴⸱ 㜮 㤮 〮 〮 㤷㤮 㔴
䵩獣敬污湥潵猠䵡湵晡捴畲楮 㤮 㐶⸰ ㈰⸳ ㄳ⸹ ㄮ 㔮 ㌮ 㔳㤴⸶ ㄸ
呯瑡氠䵡湵晡捴畲楮 㘮 ㌶⸵ ㄷ⸳ ㈴⸵ 㘮 㘮 ㈮ 㐹ㄴ⸴ ㄴㄹ
剡瑥⁯映䍨慮来⁩渠卡汥 ⠥
汥獳⁴桡渠 〭 ㌭ 㘭 㤭ㄲ ㄲⴱ 潶敲‱ 慶敲慧 乯⹯映卡浰汥
䙯潤 ㌵⸷ ㄰⸷ 㠮 ㄲ⸵ ㄰⸳ 㐮 ㄷ⸰ ⴳ⸵ ㈲
呥硴楬敳 ㌲⸶ 㤮 ㄰⸹ ㄲ⸰ ㄮ 㤮 ㈳⸹ 㘮 㤲
偡灥爠☠偵汰 㐵⸳ ㄲ⸰ 㤮 㘮 ㈮ 㐮 ㈰⸰ 〮 㜵
䍨敭楣慬 ㌰⸰ ㄳ⸰ ㄸ⸰ 㠮 㤮 㠮 ㄴ⸰ 㐮 ㄰
健瑲潬敵洠☠䍯慬 㔹⸴ 㤮 〮 ㄲ⸵ ㌮ 㘮 㤮 ⴱ⸲ ㌲
却潮攬⁃污礠☠䝬慳 ㌰⸸ 㤮 㤮 ㄲ⸳ ㄲ⸳ 㜮 ㄸ⸵ ㄶ⸵ 㘵
䥲潮…⁓瑥敬 㔰⸸ 㘮 ㌮ 㠮 㠮 㠮 ㄳ⸶ ㈮ 㔹
乯湦敲牯畳⁍整慬
䵥瑡氠偲潤畣瑳 ㌲⸵ ㄲ⸰ 㘮 㜮 㠮 㜮 ㈵⸶ ㈱⸶ ㄱ
乯渠䕬散瑲楣慬⁍慣桩湥特 ㈷⸶ 㤮 㤮 㔮 㜮 㜮 ㌲⸴ 㔸⸷ ㄰
䕬散瑲楣慬⁍慣桩湥特 ㌲⸷ 㜮 ㄷ⸰ 㤮 㐮 㐮 ㈵⸱ ㄴ⸹ ㄷ
呲慮獰潲瑡瑩潮⁅煵楰浥湴 ㌲⸶ ㄰⸱ 㠮 㠮 㘮 ㄳ⸰ ㈱⸷ ㄳ⸴ ㄳ
偲散楳楯渠䥮獴牵浥湴 ㌱⸵ ㄳ⸰ ㄳ⸰ ㄳ⸰ 㜮 㜮 ㄴ⸸ 㘮 㔴
䵩獣敬污湥潵猠䵡湵晡捴畲楮 ㌴⸲ 㤮 㔮 㤮 ㄱ⸲ 㐮 ㈶⸲ 㠮 ㄸ
呯瑡氠䵡湵晡捴畲楮 ㌴⸷ ㄰⸱ 㤮 㤮 㜮 㘮 ㈱⸶ ㄱ⸶ ㄴㄹ
₁  36腼Japan United States France
Reappraisal of tangible
fixed assets
Not accepted Not accepted Accepted. Appraisal difference will be
recorded in the assets section
Appraisal of investment Short-term by lower of book or market
value  Long-term by acquisition cost
Market value except for long-term holding
purpose(since 1994)
Short-term by lower of book or market
value  Long-term by lower of
acquisition cost or appraisal value
Depreciation method The declining-balance method is
common.
The straight腼line  method is common. Declining-balance method or straight-
line method. Company may decide
depreciation rate in the range which is
economically rational.
Accelerated depreciation Not accepted Not accepted Accepted
Recording interest as a
part of asset
Not accepted Accepted Accepted
Research & Development
cost
Can be recorded as asset Recorded as cost Can be recorded as asset






Common for retirement allowance
reserve to be accumulated up to the
allowed limit   by  the Tax Law.
Pension Funds' Assets is appraised by
the book value.
The difference between the present discount
value of expected benefits cost in the future
and pension assets  based on market price will
be recorded as accrued cost.
Can be recorded as a provision for
retirement allowance, or as a
personnel cost at the time of payment
Director's bonus Paid out of profit Recorded as cost Recorded as cost




䙯潤 〮㘵 〮㔹 ㄮ㈶
呥硴楬敳 〮㜵 〮㔹 〮㜸
偡灥爠☠偵汰 〮㜶 〮㔷 〮㔵
䍨敭楣慬 〮㜷 〮㔹 〮㔱
健瑲潬敵洠☠䍯慬 〮㔹 〮㐸 〮㌵
却潮攬⁃污礠☠䝬慳 〮㘳 〮㐴 〮㘴
䥲潮…⁓瑥敬 〮㘹 〮㘶 〮㔱
乯湦敲牯畳⁍整慬 〮㠲 〮㐶 〮㜲
䵥瑡氠偲潤畣瑳 〮㔴 〮㔴
乯渠䕬散瑲楣慬⁍慣桩湥特 〮㘸 〮㔴 〮㜰
䕬散瑲楣慬⁍慣桩湥特 〮㔸 〮㔷 ㄮ㈳
呲慮獰潲瑡瑩潮⁅煵楰浥湴 〮㐷 〮㐵 〮㔹
偲散楳楯渠䥮獴牵浥湴 〮㜰 〮㐴 〮㐵
䵩獣敬污湥潵猠䵡湵晡捴畲楮 〮㘴 〮㜲 〮㠴
呯瑡氠䵡湵晡捴畲楮 〮㘶 〮㔵 〮㜰
䍡灩瑡氠䥮癥獴浥湴⽔潴慬⁁獳整
䩡灡 啓 䙲慮捥
䙯潤 〮㜶 〮㔳 ㄮㄸ
呥硴楬敳 〮㜰 〮㘸 〮㠳
偡灥爠☠偵汰 〮㜴 〮㐱 〮㘱
䍨敭楣慬 〮㠳 〮㐶 〮㘳
健瑲潬敵洠☠䍯慬 〮㔷 〮㌹ 〮㌶
却潮攬⁃污礠☠䝬慳 〮㘷 〮㌹ 〮㜸
䥲潮…⁓瑥敬 〮㘸 〮㘶 〮㔹
乯湦敲牯畳⁍整慬 〮㠶 〮㐵 〮㘴
䵥瑡氠偲潤畣瑳 〮㘶 〮㔵
乯渠䕬散瑲楣慬⁍慣桩湥特 〮㜰 〮㐷 〮㜵
䕬散瑲楣慬⁍慣桩湥特 〮㘶 〮㔸 〮㠲
呲慮獰潲瑡瑩潮⁅煵楰浥湴 〮㔷 〮㔲 〮㠳
偲散楳楯渠䥮獴牵浥湴 〮㘷 〮㐵 〮㐴
䵩獣敬污湥潵猠䵡湵晡捴畲楮 〮㘰 〮㔵 〮㠲
呯瑡氠䵡湵晡捴畲楮 〮㘹 〮㔱 〮㜲
䍡灩瑡氠䥮癥獴浥湴⼠䍡獨⁆汯
䩡灡 啓 䙲慮捥
䙯潤 〮㜶 〮㜴 ㄮ㈳
呥硴楬敳 〮㤰 〮㠵 〮㜴
偡灥爠☠偵汰 〮㘰 〮㘹 〮㤷
䍨敭楣慬 〮㠲 ㄮ〸 〮㠵
健瑲潬敵洠☠䍯慬 〮㜹 〮㜹 〮㐷
却潮攬⁃污礠☠䝬慳 〮㠱 〮㘱 ㄮ〸
䥲潮…⁓瑥敬 〮㤲 〮㤵 〮㤴
乯湦敲牯畳⁍整慬 〮㠶 〮㜳 〮㜶
䵥瑡氠偲潤畣瑳 〮㔴 〮㜴
乯渠䕬散瑲楣慬⁍慣桩湥特 〮㤸 〮㠷 ㄮㄴ
䕬散瑲楣慬⁍慣桩湥特 ㈮㈶ ㄮ〵 〮㠷
呲慮獰潲瑡瑩潮⁅煵楰浥湴 〮㐵 ㄮ〳 〮㠹
偲散楳楯渠䥮獴牵浥湴 〮㔹 〮㤵 〮㘱
䵩獣敬污湥潵猠䵡湵晡捴畲楮 〮㔰 ㄮ〴 ㄮ㌷
















䙯潤 〮㔷 〮㠰 〮㤲 䙯潤 〮㔶 〮㜹 ㄮ㄰
呥硴楬敳 〮㘱 〮㠰 〮㜹 呥硴楬敳 〮㜶 ㄮㄷ ㄮ㠸
偡灥爠☠偵汰 〮㔷 〮㘴 〮㜰 偡灥爠☠偵汰 〮㘲 〮㜱 〮㠴
䍨敭楣慬 〮㐷 〮㘶 〮㔸 䍨敭楣慬 〮㔵 〮㜰 ㄮ㄰
健瑲潬敵洠☠䍯慬 〮㌸ 〮㐸 〮㐶 健瑲潬敵洠☠䍯慬 〮㘷 〮㠴 ㄮ㈲
却潮攬⁃污礠☠䝬慳 〮㔳 〮㘰 〮㘹 却潮攬⁃污礠☠䝬慳 〮㘰 〮㜰 〮㤷
䥲潮…⁓瑥敬 〮㔴 〮㘴 〮㜲 䥲潮…⁓瑥敬 〮㜶 〮㠱 ㄮㄹ
乯湦敲牯畳⁍整慬 〮㔰 〮㔸 〮㘵 乯湦敲牯畳⁍整慬 〮㘷 〮㠴 ㄮ㜲
䵥瑡氠偲潤畣瑳 〮㔲 〮㘵 〮㘵 䵥瑡氠偲潤畣瑳 〮㜵 ㄮ〰 ㄮ㐱
乯渠䕬散瑲楣慬⁍慣桩湥特 〮㔸 〮㜴 〮㜱 乯渠䕬散瑲楣慬⁍慣桩湥特 〮㘸 〮㠷 ㄮ㜲
䕬散瑲楣慬⁍慣桩湥特 〮㔴 〮㘱 〮㘰 䕬散瑲楣慬⁍慣桩湥特 〮㔵 ㄮ〲 ㈮ㄲ
呲慮獰潲瑡瑩潮⁅煵楰浥湴 〮㔱 〮㜲 〮㘲 呲慮獰潲瑡瑩潮⁅煵楰浥湴 〮㘲 〮㜰 ㄮ㔵
偲散楳楯渠䥮獴牵浥湴 〮㔸 〮㜰 〮㘳 偲散楳楯渠䥮獴牵浥湴 〮㐸 〮㘳 〮㜵
䵩獣敬污湥潵猠䵡湵晡捴畲楮 〮㔶 〮㘷 〮㘹 䵩獣敬污湥潵猠䵡湵晡捴畲楮 〮㜷 ㄮ㐵 ㄮ㜶














䙯潤 〮㔶 〮㜵 ㄮ〱 䙯潤 〮㜱 〮㤹 ㄮ㌳
呥硴楬敳 〮㔴 〮㜱 ㄮ㠲 呥硴楬敳 〮㠸 ㄮ〴 ㈮〸
偡灥爠☠偵汰 〮㔷 〮㘶 ㄮㄱ 偡灥爠☠偵汰 〮㜲 〮㜷 ㄮ〵
䍨敭楣慬 〮㔸 〮㘷 〮㠸 䍨敭楣慬 〮㘷 〮㜹 ㄮ㤲
健瑲潬敵洠☠䍯慬 〮㌸ 〮㔰 〮㔴 健瑲潬敵洠☠䍯慬 〮㜰 〮㠶 ㄮㄵ
却潮攬⁃污礠☠䝬慳 〮㔱 〮㘱 〮㠳 却潮攬⁃污礠☠䝬慳 〮㜵 〮㠶 ㄮㄱ
䥲潮…⁓瑥敬 〮㔸 〮㘲 ㄮ〴 䥲潮…⁓瑥敬 〮㠵 〮㤵 ㄮ㈵
乯湦敲牯畳⁍整慬 〮㐶 〮㘲 〮㤰 乯湦敲牯畳⁍整慬 〮㘵 〮㠳 ㄮ㈴
䵥瑡氠偲潤畣瑳 〮㘵 〮㘶 〮㠸 䵥瑡氠偲潤畣瑳 〮㜹 〮㤹 ㄮ㘲
乯渠䕬散瑲楣慬⁍慣桩湥特 〮㜵 〮㠴 ㄮ㌴ 乯渠䕬散瑲楣慬⁍慣桩湥特 〮㜰 〮㤴 ㄮ㔷
䕬散瑲楣慬⁍慣桩湥特 〮㔸 〮㘹 〮㤱 䕬散瑲楣慬⁍慣桩湥特 〮㔶 〮㜴 ㈮㜲
呲慮獰潲瑡瑩潮⁅煵楰浥湴 〮㐱 〮㔸 〮㜸 呲慮獰潲瑡瑩潮⁅煵楰浥湴 〮㐸 〮㘳 ㄮ〸
偲散楳楯渠䥮獴牵浥湴 〮㔵 〮㘰 〮㜵 偲散楳楯渠䥮獴牵浥湴 〮㘶 〮㜶 〮㤷
䵩獣敬污湥潵猠䵡湵晡捴畲楮 〮㘲 〮㜰 ㄮㄲ 䵩獣敬污湥潵猠䵡湵晡捴畲楮 〮㘷 〮㠱 ㄮ〷
呯瑡氠䵡湵晡捴畲楮 〮㔵 〮㘶 〮㤹 呯瑡氠䵡湵晡捴畲楮 〮㜰 〮㠵 ㄮ㐴









䍨敭楣慬 〮㈵ 〮㈶ 〮㌱
䥲潮…⁓瑥敬 〮ㄸ 〮ㄹ 〮㈳
䕬散瑲楣慬⁍慣桩湥特 〮㈹ 〮㌹ 〮㌷
卨楰扵楬摩湧 〮㌶ 〮㔶 〮㌷








䍨敭楣慬 〮㌳ 〮㌲ 〮㌳
䥲潮…⁓瑥敬 〮ㄹ 〮㈲ 〮㐴
䕬散瑲楣慬⁍慣桩湥特 〮㌰ 〮㐰 〮㐳
卨楰扵楬摩湧 〮㈷ 〮㐹 〮㔰








䍨敭楣慬 〮㔰 〮㔳 〮㔹
䥲潮…⁓瑥敬 〮㈴ 〮㈹ 〮㌱
䕬散瑲楣慬⁍慣桩湥特 〮㈴ 〮㐱 〮㌸
卨楰扵楬摩湧 〮㌰ 〮㐱 〮㌹








䍨敭楣慬 〮㐶 〮㐹 〮㔷
䥲潮…⁓瑥敬 〮㈸ 〮㈷ 〮㌴
䕬散瑲楣慬⁍慣桩湥特 〮㈵ 〮㐲 〮㌵
卨楰扵楬摩湧 〮㌴ 〮㐲 〮㐴















卡浰汥 汥獳⁴桡渠 ㄠ瑯‴ 㐠瑯‷ 㜠瑯‱ ㄰⁴漠㈰ 潶敲′ 䅶敲慧
䙯潤 ㌶ ㈮ ㈮ ㄶ⸷ ㈲⸲ ㌶⸱ ㄹ⸴ ㄲ⸱
呥硴楬敳 ㄷ 〮 ㈳⸵ ㈳⸵ ㈳⸵ ㈹⸴ 〮 㜮㜰
偡灥爠☠偵汰 ㄲ 〮 㠮 㔸⸳ ㄶ⸷ ㄶ⸷ 〮 㘮㘶
䍨敭楣慬 㘳 ㌮ 㠴⸱ ㄱ⸱ ㄮ 〮 〮 ㈮㔲
健瑲潬敵洠☠䍯慬 㔰⸰ 㔰⸰ 〮 〮 〮 〮 〮㠷
却潮攬⁃污礠☠䝬慳 ㄷ 〮 ㄷ⸶ 㔲⸹ ㄱ⸸ ㄷ⸶ 〮 㜮㜸
䥲潮…⁓瑥敬 ㈱ 〮 ㄴ⸳ 㐷⸶ ㄴ⸳ ㈳⸸ 〮 㜮㘰
乯湦敲牯畳⁍整慬 ㄸ 〮 㔮 㔵⸶ ㈲⸲ ㄱ⸱ 㔮 㜮㔵
䵥瑡氠偲潤畣瑳 ㄷ 〮 㐷⸱ 㔲⸹ 〮 〮 〮 㐮㐳
乯渠䕬散瑲楣慬⁍慣桩湥特 㐷 㘮 㔱⸱ ㌸⸳ 㐮 〮 〮 ㌮㠴
䕬散瑲楣慬⁍慣桩湥特 㘰 ㈰⸰ 㜶⸷ ㌮ 〮 〮 〮 ㄮ㔵
呲慮獰潲瑡瑩潮⁅煵楰浥湴 㐳 〮 㘷⸴ ㈵⸶ 㜮 〮 〮 ㌮㜵
偲散楳楯渠䥮獴牵浥湴 ㄲ 〮 㐱⸷ ㌳⸳ 㠮 ㄶ⸷ 〮 㔮ㄸ
䵩獣敬污湥潵猠䵡湵晡捴畲楮 ㌲ 〮 ㌱⸳ 㐰⸶ ㈱⸹ 㘮 〮 㔮㜳
呯瑡氠䵡湵晡捴畲楮 㐰 㔮 㐷⸶ ㈷⸴ 㤮 㠮 ㈮ 㐮㤸
啓
呯瑡氠乯⹯
卡浰汥 汥獳⁴桡渠 ㄠ瑯‴ 㐠瑯‷ 㜠瑯‱ ㄰⁴漠㈰ 潶敲′ 䅶敲慧
䙯潤 ㌱ 〮 〮 〮 㘮 㔴⸸ ㌸⸷ ㈱⸷
呥硴楬敳 ㄲ 〮 〮 ㈵⸰ ㌳⸳ 㐱⸷ 〮 㤮㜳
偡灥爠☠偵汰 ㈰ 〮 〮 㜵⸰ ㈵⸰ 〮 〮 㘮〹
䍨敭楣慬 㐷 〮 ㈵⸵ 㐸⸹ ㄹ⸱ 㘮 〮 㔮㠱
健瑲潬敵洠☠䍯慬 ㈲ 〮 㜷⸳ ㄳ⸶ 㤮 〮 〮 ㈮㤷
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